
コーダーがセキュリティインフラストラクチャを征服するコードシリーズ:セキュリティの設定ミス-不適切な権限
Threats to cybersecurity these days are ubiquitous and relentless. It's gotten so bad that trying to keep up with them after programs are deployed has become almost impossible. Instead, shrewd organizations are embracing the concept of infrastructure as code, whereby developers contribute to crafting secure applications while they are still being created. This series is all about getting you security-ready, so you can understand steps you can take as a developer to begin deploying secure infrastructure as code in your own organization.
Security misconfigurations, especially those of the improper permissions variety, most often happen whenever a developer creates a new user or grants permission for an application as a tool in order to accomplish a task. For example, this could be done to collect information from a database. But if the permissions for the new user are set too high, or not configured by default for the task at hand, it can introduce a serious vulnerability into the code.
Before we get into it, why not test your skills right now? Try to find and fix some improper permission vulnerabilities:
How did you do? Let's dig a little deeper:
Giving a user or application full permissions, or simply never bothering to define what the new user should be able to accomplish and what behaviors are restricted, is certainly the fastest way to get new code in place. And if all goes perfectly well, the application will make use of those permissions to accomplish its assigned task. The danger is that a hacker will discover this process and then compromise that user. Even though the user was created to accomplish a specific function for a particular application, if compromised it can allow an attacker to endanger other applications, data or even the network.
How are security misconfigurations exploited?
To visualize the danger, let's take a look at how a common task is sometimes coded within the Docker cloud environment. Let's say that a developer is using the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service to collect information from a database. The easiest way to allow that to happen is to grant the exporter permission to access the database. So the code might be something like:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT ALL ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
This would certainly make it so that the exporter could accomplish its task. However, because the permissions are not defined, the exporter actually has the ability to do almost anything. Obviously, the exporter itself would never act outside of its programmed behaviors. But what would happen if an attacker were able to compromise the exporter service? In that case, because it was given full permissions, the attacker could perform all kinds of unauthorized tasks with the SQL service.
Securing and eliminating improper permissions
Here again, we turn to the concept of infrastructure as code. If you code security into your applications as they are being created, then the network is always going to be on a much better overall footing when it comes to cybersecurity.
In the Docker example from above, if a developer wants the Prometheus MySQL Exporter to be able to query a database, they can make that happen more safely by defining what it should be allowed to accomplish. A good example of this would be:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT PROCESS, REPLICATION CLIENT ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
In this case, the MySQL user configured for the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service only has restricted permissions over the MySQL service. Specifically, only PROCESS and REPLICATION CLIENT privileges are allowed. This would prevent a malicious user from taking advantage of a compromised Prometheus MySQL exporter service.
Restricting permissions at the code level can ensure that users and applications only have enough permissions for the task at hand. And that can go a long way to securing your networks and embracing the concept of infrastructure as code.
Check out the Secure Code Warrior blog pages for more insight about this vulnerability and how to protect your organization and customers from the ravages of other security flaws. You can also try our showcase of the Secure Code Warrior training platform to keep all your cybersecurity skills honed and up-to-date.


セキュリティの設定ミス、特に不適切な権限の設定は、開発者がタスクを実行するために新しいユーザーを作成したり、ツールとしてアプリケーションに権限を付与したりする場合に発生することがほとんどです。
マティアス・マドゥ博士は、セキュリティ専門家、研究者、CTO、セキュア・コード・ウォリアーの共同創設者です。Matias はゲント大学で静的分析ソリューションを中心にアプリケーションセキュリティの博士号を取得しました。その後、米国のFortifyに入社し、開発者が安全なコードを書くのを手伝わずに、コードの問題を検出するだけでは不十分であることに気づきました。これがきっかけで、開発者を支援し、セキュリティの負担を軽減し、顧客の期待を超える製品を開発するようになりました。Team Awesome の一員としてデスクにいないときは、RSA カンファレンス、BlackHat、DefCon などのカンファレンスでプレゼンテーションを行うステージでのプレゼンテーションを楽しんでいます。

Secure Code Warriorは、ソフトウェア開発ライフサイクル全体にわたってコードを保護し、サイバーセキュリティを最優先とする文化を築くお手伝いをします。アプリケーションセキュリティマネージャ、開発者、CISO、またはセキュリティ関係者のいずれであっても、安全でないコードに関連するリスクを軽減するお手伝いをします。
デモを予約マティアス・マドゥ博士は、セキュリティ専門家、研究者、CTO、セキュア・コード・ウォリアーの共同創設者です。Matias はゲント大学で静的分析ソリューションを中心にアプリケーションセキュリティの博士号を取得しました。その後、米国のFortifyに入社し、開発者が安全なコードを書くのを手伝わずに、コードの問題を検出するだけでは不十分であることに気づきました。これがきっかけで、開発者を支援し、セキュリティの負担を軽減し、顧客の期待を超える製品を開発するようになりました。Team Awesome の一員としてデスクにいないときは、RSA カンファレンス、BlackHat、DefCon などのカンファレンスでプレゼンテーションを行うステージでのプレゼンテーションを楽しんでいます。
Matiasは、15年以上のソフトウェアセキュリティの実務経験を持つ研究者および開発者です。フォーティファイ・ソフトウェアや自身の会社であるセンセイ・セキュリティなどの企業向けにソリューションを開発してきました。マティアスはキャリアを通じて、複数のアプリケーションセキュリティ研究プロジェクトを主導し、それが商用製品につながり、10件以上の特許を取得しています。デスクから離れているときには、マティアスは上級アプリケーション・セキュリティ・トレーニング・コースの講師を務め、RSA Conference、Black Hat、DefCon、BSIMM、OWASP AppSec、BruConなどのグローバルカンファレンスで定期的に講演を行っています。
マティアスはゲント大学でコンピューター工学の博士号を取得し、そこでアプリケーションの内部動作を隠すためのプログラムの難読化によるアプリケーションセキュリティを学びました。


Threats to cybersecurity these days are ubiquitous and relentless. It's gotten so bad that trying to keep up with them after programs are deployed has become almost impossible. Instead, shrewd organizations are embracing the concept of infrastructure as code, whereby developers contribute to crafting secure applications while they are still being created. This series is all about getting you security-ready, so you can understand steps you can take as a developer to begin deploying secure infrastructure as code in your own organization.
Security misconfigurations, especially those of the improper permissions variety, most often happen whenever a developer creates a new user or grants permission for an application as a tool in order to accomplish a task. For example, this could be done to collect information from a database. But if the permissions for the new user are set too high, or not configured by default for the task at hand, it can introduce a serious vulnerability into the code.
Before we get into it, why not test your skills right now? Try to find and fix some improper permission vulnerabilities:
How did you do? Let's dig a little deeper:
Giving a user or application full permissions, or simply never bothering to define what the new user should be able to accomplish and what behaviors are restricted, is certainly the fastest way to get new code in place. And if all goes perfectly well, the application will make use of those permissions to accomplish its assigned task. The danger is that a hacker will discover this process and then compromise that user. Even though the user was created to accomplish a specific function for a particular application, if compromised it can allow an attacker to endanger other applications, data or even the network.
How are security misconfigurations exploited?
To visualize the danger, let's take a look at how a common task is sometimes coded within the Docker cloud environment. Let's say that a developer is using the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service to collect information from a database. The easiest way to allow that to happen is to grant the exporter permission to access the database. So the code might be something like:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT ALL ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
This would certainly make it so that the exporter could accomplish its task. However, because the permissions are not defined, the exporter actually has the ability to do almost anything. Obviously, the exporter itself would never act outside of its programmed behaviors. But what would happen if an attacker were able to compromise the exporter service? In that case, because it was given full permissions, the attacker could perform all kinds of unauthorized tasks with the SQL service.
Securing and eliminating improper permissions
Here again, we turn to the concept of infrastructure as code. If you code security into your applications as they are being created, then the network is always going to be on a much better overall footing when it comes to cybersecurity.
In the Docker example from above, if a developer wants the Prometheus MySQL Exporter to be able to query a database, they can make that happen more safely by defining what it should be allowed to accomplish. A good example of this would be:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT PROCESS, REPLICATION CLIENT ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
In this case, the MySQL user configured for the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service only has restricted permissions over the MySQL service. Specifically, only PROCESS and REPLICATION CLIENT privileges are allowed. This would prevent a malicious user from taking advantage of a compromised Prometheus MySQL exporter service.
Restricting permissions at the code level can ensure that users and applications only have enough permissions for the task at hand. And that can go a long way to securing your networks and embracing the concept of infrastructure as code.
Check out the Secure Code Warrior blog pages for more insight about this vulnerability and how to protect your organization and customers from the ravages of other security flaws. You can also try our showcase of the Secure Code Warrior training platform to keep all your cybersecurity skills honed and up-to-date.

Threats to cybersecurity these days are ubiquitous and relentless. It's gotten so bad that trying to keep up with them after programs are deployed has become almost impossible. Instead, shrewd organizations are embracing the concept of infrastructure as code, whereby developers contribute to crafting secure applications while they are still being created. This series is all about getting you security-ready, so you can understand steps you can take as a developer to begin deploying secure infrastructure as code in your own organization.
Security misconfigurations, especially those of the improper permissions variety, most often happen whenever a developer creates a new user or grants permission for an application as a tool in order to accomplish a task. For example, this could be done to collect information from a database. But if the permissions for the new user are set too high, or not configured by default for the task at hand, it can introduce a serious vulnerability into the code.
Before we get into it, why not test your skills right now? Try to find and fix some improper permission vulnerabilities:
How did you do? Let's dig a little deeper:
Giving a user or application full permissions, or simply never bothering to define what the new user should be able to accomplish and what behaviors are restricted, is certainly the fastest way to get new code in place. And if all goes perfectly well, the application will make use of those permissions to accomplish its assigned task. The danger is that a hacker will discover this process and then compromise that user. Even though the user was created to accomplish a specific function for a particular application, if compromised it can allow an attacker to endanger other applications, data or even the network.
How are security misconfigurations exploited?
To visualize the danger, let's take a look at how a common task is sometimes coded within the Docker cloud environment. Let's say that a developer is using the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service to collect information from a database. The easiest way to allow that to happen is to grant the exporter permission to access the database. So the code might be something like:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT ALL ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
This would certainly make it so that the exporter could accomplish its task. However, because the permissions are not defined, the exporter actually has the ability to do almost anything. Obviously, the exporter itself would never act outside of its programmed behaviors. But what would happen if an attacker were able to compromise the exporter service? In that case, because it was given full permissions, the attacker could perform all kinds of unauthorized tasks with the SQL service.
Securing and eliminating improper permissions
Here again, we turn to the concept of infrastructure as code. If you code security into your applications as they are being created, then the network is always going to be on a much better overall footing when it comes to cybersecurity.
In the Docker example from above, if a developer wants the Prometheus MySQL Exporter to be able to query a database, they can make that happen more safely by defining what it should be allowed to accomplish. A good example of this would be:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT PROCESS, REPLICATION CLIENT ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
In this case, the MySQL user configured for the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service only has restricted permissions over the MySQL service. Specifically, only PROCESS and REPLICATION CLIENT privileges are allowed. This would prevent a malicious user from taking advantage of a compromised Prometheus MySQL exporter service.
Restricting permissions at the code level can ensure that users and applications only have enough permissions for the task at hand. And that can go a long way to securing your networks and embracing the concept of infrastructure as code.
Check out the Secure Code Warrior blog pages for more insight about this vulnerability and how to protect your organization and customers from the ravages of other security flaws. You can also try our showcase of the Secure Code Warrior training platform to keep all your cybersecurity skills honed and up-to-date.

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Secure Code Warriorは、ソフトウェア開発ライフサイクル全体にわたってコードを保護し、サイバーセキュリティを最優先とする文化を築くお手伝いをします。アプリケーションセキュリティマネージャ、開発者、CISO、またはセキュリティ関係者のいずれであっても、安全でないコードに関連するリスクを軽減するお手伝いをします。
レポートを表示デモを予約マティアス・マドゥ博士は、セキュリティ専門家、研究者、CTO、セキュア・コード・ウォリアーの共同創設者です。Matias はゲント大学で静的分析ソリューションを中心にアプリケーションセキュリティの博士号を取得しました。その後、米国のFortifyに入社し、開発者が安全なコードを書くのを手伝わずに、コードの問題を検出するだけでは不十分であることに気づきました。これがきっかけで、開発者を支援し、セキュリティの負担を軽減し、顧客の期待を超える製品を開発するようになりました。Team Awesome の一員としてデスクにいないときは、RSA カンファレンス、BlackHat、DefCon などのカンファレンスでプレゼンテーションを行うステージでのプレゼンテーションを楽しんでいます。
Matiasは、15年以上のソフトウェアセキュリティの実務経験を持つ研究者および開発者です。フォーティファイ・ソフトウェアや自身の会社であるセンセイ・セキュリティなどの企業向けにソリューションを開発してきました。マティアスはキャリアを通じて、複数のアプリケーションセキュリティ研究プロジェクトを主導し、それが商用製品につながり、10件以上の特許を取得しています。デスクから離れているときには、マティアスは上級アプリケーション・セキュリティ・トレーニング・コースの講師を務め、RSA Conference、Black Hat、DefCon、BSIMM、OWASP AppSec、BruConなどのグローバルカンファレンスで定期的に講演を行っています。
マティアスはゲント大学でコンピューター工学の博士号を取得し、そこでアプリケーションの内部動作を隠すためのプログラムの難読化によるアプリケーションセキュリティを学びました。
Threats to cybersecurity these days are ubiquitous and relentless. It's gotten so bad that trying to keep up with them after programs are deployed has become almost impossible. Instead, shrewd organizations are embracing the concept of infrastructure as code, whereby developers contribute to crafting secure applications while they are still being created. This series is all about getting you security-ready, so you can understand steps you can take as a developer to begin deploying secure infrastructure as code in your own organization.
Security misconfigurations, especially those of the improper permissions variety, most often happen whenever a developer creates a new user or grants permission for an application as a tool in order to accomplish a task. For example, this could be done to collect information from a database. But if the permissions for the new user are set too high, or not configured by default for the task at hand, it can introduce a serious vulnerability into the code.
Before we get into it, why not test your skills right now? Try to find and fix some improper permission vulnerabilities:
How did you do? Let's dig a little deeper:
Giving a user or application full permissions, or simply never bothering to define what the new user should be able to accomplish and what behaviors are restricted, is certainly the fastest way to get new code in place. And if all goes perfectly well, the application will make use of those permissions to accomplish its assigned task. The danger is that a hacker will discover this process and then compromise that user. Even though the user was created to accomplish a specific function for a particular application, if compromised it can allow an attacker to endanger other applications, data or even the network.
How are security misconfigurations exploited?
To visualize the danger, let's take a look at how a common task is sometimes coded within the Docker cloud environment. Let's say that a developer is using the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service to collect information from a database. The easiest way to allow that to happen is to grant the exporter permission to access the database. So the code might be something like:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT ALL ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
This would certainly make it so that the exporter could accomplish its task. However, because the permissions are not defined, the exporter actually has the ability to do almost anything. Obviously, the exporter itself would never act outside of its programmed behaviors. But what would happen if an attacker were able to compromise the exporter service? In that case, because it was given full permissions, the attacker could perform all kinds of unauthorized tasks with the SQL service.
Securing and eliminating improper permissions
Here again, we turn to the concept of infrastructure as code. If you code security into your applications as they are being created, then the network is always going to be on a much better overall footing when it comes to cybersecurity.
In the Docker example from above, if a developer wants the Prometheus MySQL Exporter to be able to query a database, they can make that happen more safely by defining what it should be allowed to accomplish. A good example of this would be:
FROM mysql:latest
COPY ./scripts/create_users.sh /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/
USER 999
CREATE USER exporter@% IDENTIFIED BY $EXPORTER_PASSWORD;
GRANT PROCESS, REPLICATION CLIENT ON *.* TO exporter@%;
GRANT SELECT ON performance_schema.* TO exporter@%;
In this case, the MySQL user configured for the Prometheus MySQL Exporter service only has restricted permissions over the MySQL service. Specifically, only PROCESS and REPLICATION CLIENT privileges are allowed. This would prevent a malicious user from taking advantage of a compromised Prometheus MySQL exporter service.
Restricting permissions at the code level can ensure that users and applications only have enough permissions for the task at hand. And that can go a long way to securing your networks and embracing the concept of infrastructure as code.
Check out the Secure Code Warrior blog pages for more insight about this vulnerability and how to protect your organization and customers from the ravages of other security flaws. You can also try our showcase of the Secure Code Warrior training platform to keep all your cybersecurity skills honed and up-to-date.
目次
マティアス・マドゥ博士は、セキュリティ専門家、研究者、CTO、セキュア・コード・ウォリアーの共同創設者です。Matias はゲント大学で静的分析ソリューションを中心にアプリケーションセキュリティの博士号を取得しました。その後、米国のFortifyに入社し、開発者が安全なコードを書くのを手伝わずに、コードの問題を検出するだけでは不十分であることに気づきました。これがきっかけで、開発者を支援し、セキュリティの負担を軽減し、顧客の期待を超える製品を開発するようになりました。Team Awesome の一員としてデスクにいないときは、RSA カンファレンス、BlackHat、DefCon などのカンファレンスでプレゼンテーションを行うステージでのプレゼンテーションを楽しんでいます。

Secure Code Warriorは、ソフトウェア開発ライフサイクル全体にわたってコードを保護し、サイバーセキュリティを最優先とする文化を築くお手伝いをします。アプリケーションセキュリティマネージャ、開発者、CISO、またはセキュリティ関係者のいずれであっても、安全でないコードに関連するリスクを軽減するお手伝いをします。
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